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Windt’s groundbreaking commentary expands and enriches my target article by
presenting new considerations against the default neuroscience view that “con-
sciousness is that which disappears in dreamless sleep,” by proposing a refined
conceptual and phenomenological analysis of dreamless sleep experience, and by
offering a refined taxonomy of dreamless sleep experiences. These contributions
provide new conceptual and methodological tools for the neurophenomenology of
sleep and consciousness.
Keywords
Consciousness | Dreamless sleep | Neurophenomenology | Phenomenal selfhood |
Self | Time consciousness | Vedānta | Yoga
Author
Evan Thompson
evan.thompson@ubc.ca   
University of British Columbia
Vancouver, BC, Canada
Commentator
Jennifer M. Windt
jennifer.windt@monash.edu   
Monash University
Melbourne, Australia
Editors
Thomas Metzinger
metzinger@uni-mainz.de   
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität
Mainz, Germany
Jennifer M. Windt
jennifer.windt@monash.edu   
Monash University
Melbourne, Australia
1 Introduction
I  would  like  to  begin  by  thanking  Jennifer
Windt  for  her  outstanding,  constructive  com-
mentary (Windt 2015b, this collection) on my
target article (Thompson 2015a, this collection),
and by expressing my great admiration for her
rich discussion, which goes well beyond being a
commentary and instead amounts to an original
and substantive article in its own right. It is es-
pecially  gratifying  to  see  the  ideas  and argu-
ments that I presented be refined and advanced
in such a creative and precise way. Indeed, given
the wealth of new material  that she presents,
her paper calls not so much for a reply as for a
commentary of its own. Such a task, however, is
beyond the scope of this short reply. Instead, I
wish  to  highlight  the  advances  that  Windt
makes, so that new experimental research can
begin in this area.
The main aims of my target article were
(i) to use debates about sleep from classical In-
dian philosophy to call into question the “de-
fault view” in cognitive neuroscience that “con-
sciousness is that which disappears in dreamless
sleep,” (ii) to suggest instead that there may be
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states or phases of dreamless sleep in which con-
sciousness  is  present,  (iii)  to  argue  that  sleep
science  accordingly  needs  a  more  refined
neurophenomenological  taxonomy  of  sleep
states, and (iv) to demonstrate how contemplat-
ive methods of mind training provide important
resources for the neurophenomenology of sleep
and consciousness. 
Windt’s  commentary  advances  each  of
these four aims in substantive ways, as I will de-
scribe in the following sections.
2 Indian philosophy and sleep science
After  answering  several  possible  challenges  to
my arguments against the default view (see Sec-
tion 1 of her commentary), Windt shows that
the Indian philosophical  debate (in which the
Yoga and Vedānta schools argue that conscious-
ness  persists  throughout  dreamless  sleep,
whereas  the  Nyāya  school  denies  this  claim)
parallels  in  certain  key  respects  the  Western
philosophical  and scientific  debates  about  the
trustworthiness  of  dream  reports.  Given  that
sleep science must assume as a methodological
criterion  of  dream research  that  retrospective
reports of dreaming and nondreaming are trust-
worthy  (given  ideal  reporting  conditions),  we
must similarly assume that retrospective reports
of the presence or the absence of experience in
dreamless  sleep  are  also  trustworthy  (again,
given ideal reporting conditions). This require-
ment in turn implies that we must refine the
conceptual  typology  of  retrospective  reports
upon awakening from sleep. In Windt’s (2015b,
p. 11) words, “reports  of  nondreaming should
be  further  qualified:  reporting  the  absence  of
experience is not the same as reporting dream-
less sleep experience. The former is an instance
of reporting an absence of experience, the latter
is an instance of reporting a form of experience
characterized by the absence of intentional ob-
jects; but it is still an experience report.” I will
not review the steps of her analysis of the meth-
odological requirements of sleep and dream sci-
ence in detail (see Section 2 of her comment-
ary),  but the upshot is  that the default  view
turns out to be inconsistent with the methodo-
logical  background  assumptions  of  scientific
sleep  and  dream  research.  This  conclusion
strengthens the case against the default  view,
for whereas I argue that this view is likely to be
empirically false, Windt shows that it is incon-
sistent with the methodological requirements for
scientifically investigating the presence and ab-
sence of consciousness in sleep.
3 The phenomenology of dreamless sleep
experience
Windt’s  second  contribution  is  to  propose  a
conceptual  and  phenomenological  model  of
dreamless sleep experience (see Section 3 of her
commentary). Starting from my presentation of
the Indian conception of dreamless sleep experi-
ence as characterized by a feeling of peaceful-
ness  and the dissolution of  the  subject-object
duality, as well as my comparison of this con-
ception with Husserl’s conception of pre-reflect-
ive  and  pre-egological  retentional  time  con-
sciousness  (see  Thompson 2007),  Windt  pro-
poses that dreamless sleep experience is a can-
didate for minimal phenomenal experience, one
characterized  only  by  the  phenomenal  “now”
and a sense of duration, but having no further
intentional  content.  So  described,  dreamless
sleep experience would qualify as the simplest
form in which a state can be phenomenally con-
scious, namely, as minimal phenomenal tempor-
ality. 
I find this analysis very promising, though
two  issues  require  further  analysis.  The  first
concerns  whether  such a minimal  phenomenal
experience counts as “selfless.” Windt proposes
that it does, because minimal phenomenal self-
hood requires some sense of spatial self-location,
whereas dreamless sleep experience consists only
in a minimal sense of temporal self-location—
not, of course, in the sense of mental time travel
(retrospection and prospection),  but  rather  in
the sense of  a  bare feeling of  existing “now,”
with a minimal feeling of flow or duration. Nev-
ertheless,  both  Advaita  Vedānta  and  Husserl
would take issue with this conception of a phe-
nomenal state as “selfless.” As I describe in my
target  article,  Advaita  Vedānta  describes
dreamless sleep experience as a state in which
the true nature of the self as non-intentional, re-
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flexive consciousness is more apparent than in
the ordinary waking and dreaming states. For
his  part,  Husserl  also  describes  the  pre-egolo-
gical  retentional  time consciousness  as  a min-
imal  structure  of  self-experience  (see  Zahavi
2005;  Thompson 2007). It may be that this is-
sue is in part terminological, but there are also
likely  to  be  deeper  conceptual  disagreements
about  how  to  analyze  the  notion  of  self—
whether this notion can be applied to the re-
flexivity of passive retention (Husserl) or the re-
flexivity  of  pure  awareness  (Vedanta),  or
whether such states do not meet the criteria for
minimal phenomenal selfhood.
Second,  and relatedly,  I  proposed  in  my
target article that, from a Western phenomeno-
logical  and  cognitive  scientific  perspective,
dreamless sleep experience might be describable
as a minimal mode of sentience consisting in the
feeling of being alive. My point in describing the
experience this way was to call attention to the
possibly minimal sense of embodiment present
in the state. Windt’s proposal raises the ques-
tion of whether even this minimal sense of em-
bodiment  may  drop  away  in  dreamless  sleep,
leaving only a bare phenomenal sense of “now.”
One way to address this question would be to
determine whether there can be such a minimal
phenomenal temporality in sleep with no affect-
ive  character,  given  that  one  might  take  the
presence  of  an affective  phenomenal  character
to imply some felt sense of embodiment (assum-
ing that there is a constitutive relation between
affect and felt embodiment).
4 The neurophenomenology of sleep 
states
Windt usefully enlarges the concept of dream-
less sleep experience to include a variety of dif-
ferent dreamless sleep states (see Section 4 of
her  commentary).  These  states  include  lucid
dreamless  sleep  (especially  the  experiential
transition from lucid dreaming to lucid dream-
less sleep), a possible subclass of white dreams
(in which individuals describe the impression of
having dreamed but are unable to describe the
dream in  any  detail),  subjective  insomnia  (in
which  some  individuals  may  maintain  pre-re-
flective awareness  of  their  ongoing sleep state
while mistakenly conceptualizing their state as
wakefulness),  in addition to the contemplative
practices  of  lucid  dreamless  sleep  that  I  de-
scribe.  Windt’s  taxonomy  is  groundbreaking
and opens  many new avenues  for  the  experi-
mental  neurophenomenology  of  sleep.  This  is
exactly the kind of  work I envisioned when I
suggested that we need a more fine-grained and
phenomenologically informed taxonomy of sleep
states.
5 Contemplative sleep states
In my target article, I called attention to the
importance  of  meditative  practices  of  dream
yoga  and  lucid  dreamless  sleep,  because  they
are closely connected to the Advaita Vedānta,
Yoga,  and  Indian  Buddhist  conceptions  of
dreamless sleep, and have begun to be investig-
ated by cognitive neuroscientists (see Thompson
2015b for  further  discussion).  I  agree  with
Windt that these practices may be too remote
from other kinds of sleep experiences in order to
justify a wholesale revision of the standard tax-
onomy of sleep states. For this reason, it is im-
portant  to place these  meditative  sleep  states
within  a  wider  taxonomy that  includes  other
kinds of sleep states, specifically the dreamless
sleep states that Windt details. In this way, the
meditative practices and their effects on sleep
can be integrated into the rest of sleep science.
Windt’s article provides an excellent framework
to this end.
6 Conclusion
Windt’s commentary goes far beyond mere com-
mentary in offering new arguments against the de-
fault neuroscience view that consciousness is that
which disappears in dreamless sleep, by providing
a refined conceptual proposal about the phenom-
enal structure of dreamless sleep experience, and
by presenting a new taxonomy of dreamless sleep
states and experiences. Thanks to her comment-
ary,  sleep  science  and  the  neuroscience  of  con-
sciousness  have  new conceptual  and  methodolo-
gical  tools  for  refining  the  investigation of  con-
sciousness during sleep (see also Windt 2015a).
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